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ABSTRACT 
  Guilty pleas have come to resolve all but a fraction of federal 
criminal cases. So for most federal defendants, sentencing is the 
criminal justice process’s most important phase. That phase begins 
with the calculation of a recommended sentencing range based on the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. If a defendant has previously committed 
two violent crimes or drug offenses, the Guidelines designate him a 
career offender and drastically enhance his recommended sentencing 
range. The range is only advisory, but judges must consult and 
account for the range, and it plays an unquestionably significant role 
in the defendant’s ultimate sentence. What if the Supreme Court later 
clarifies that the defendant’s crimes were not career offender 
predicates after all? What if the correct inputs would have yielded a 
shorter sentence? 
  This Note examines remedies for mistakes like erroneously 
applying the career offender enhancement. It begins by exploring the 
federal sentencing system’s background and the available remedies 
for sentencing errors in general, including some remedies grounded in 
a due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. It 
discusses sentencing and appellate-review practices since the Supreme 
Court made the Guidelines advisory, and observes how courts of 
appeals have treated those practices—erroneous career offender 
enhancements are generally curable on direct appeal, but recent 
appellate decisions have denied relief to prisoners who are subjected 
to the same errors but whose sentences had already become final. This 
discussion concludes by scrutinizing those cases and discussing them 
in the context of concerns for due process and fundamental fairness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Guilty pleas resolve all but a fraction of federal criminal cases, so 
most defendants’ prison time depends almost entirely on sentencing.1 
Broadly speaking, that process begins with a presentence report 
about the defendant and the offense2 and with a Sentencing 
Guidelines range based on the crime’s offense level and the 
defendant’s criminal history.3 The range is intended to reflect the 
Sentencing Commission’s expert assessment, based on congressional 
and judicial policy, of the appropriate punishment for particular 
defendants and their crimes. 
The calculation’s most crucial inflection point is whether 
defendants qualify for a “Criminal History Override”—that is, one of 
the Guidelines enhancements that increase defendants’ 
recommended sentences more severely than anything else in the 
Guidelines.4 The most common override is the career offender 
enhancement: defendants with two prior felonies for drugs or 
violence see their offense level, criminal history, and downstream 
Guidelines range increase dramatically.5 
But what if the judge makes a mistake? What if the judge counts 
a defendant’s prior misdemeanor as a felony instead? Or what if the 
Supreme Court later clarifies that a career offender’s predicates 
should not have counted toward an enhancement in the first place?6 
In the 2015 term, the Supreme Court introduced even more 
uncertainty into the system by going beyond excluding certain crimes 
from the list of valid predicates and ruling that certain language 
 
 1. See Figure C: Guilty Pleas and Trial Rates, 2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/FigureC.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y2DY-X27F] 
(demonstrating that pleas dispose of 97 percent of federal cases).  
 2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)–(b) (providing for presentence investigation and report). 
 3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014) (detailing instructions for calculating and applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). 
 4. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Criminal History Outline 9–12 (paper presented at the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission 2011 Annual National Seminar), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-seminar/2011/004a_Criminal_History_Outline.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/4HYP-HLQ5]; see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.4 
(“Terrorism”), 4B1.1 (“Career Offender”), 4B1.4 (“Armed Career Criminal”), 4B1.5 (“Repeat 
and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors”). 
 5. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (defining career offenders and 
setting forth the status’s enhancements). 
 6. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 122 (2009) (holding that an escape 
conviction based on a failure to report is not a “violent felony”); Begay v. United States, 553 
U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (holding that a drunk-driving conviction is not a “violent felony”). 
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describing violent predicates for statutory minimums—language 
identical to the recidivist enhancements in the Guidelines—is 
unconstitutionally vague.7 Prisoners in such a predicament face the 
legal morass of sentence review that emerged after Congress 
remodeled sentencing into a mandatory-guidelines system, which the 
Supreme Court in turn upended in United States v. Booker8 by making 
that system advisory.9 
This Note examines the remedies for those mistakes, in 
particular for mistaken career offender enhancements. Part I surveys 
the legislative–judicial tug-of-war that produced today’s advisory-
Guidelines regime, including practices before and after the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. In particular, this Part points out a 
collateral remedy for sentencing mistakes that emanates from a due 
process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. 
Part II explores sentencing and appellate-review practices since 
Booker, including advisory sentencing and the “reasonableness” test 
for appellate review that the advisory system spawned. Part III 
examines how courts of appeals have implemented this test. 
Part IV explores remedies on collateral review. Guilty pleas 
resolve cases quickly, but cases redefining enhancement predicates 
may come years after the appeal window has closed. Prisoners 
challenging career offender mistakes are likely to do so on collateral 
review. Unfortunately for them, courts of appeals have recently said 
that collateral review is too late. Applying a scantly developed 
standard that asks whether leaving the error uncorrected would 
amount to a “miscarriage of justice,” these courts have said it would 
not. Many of these decisions cite an interest in finality and the district 
judge’s discretion should the defendant be resentenced.10 
But history reveals that the bar for collaterally correcting a 
mistaken sentence is even higher today than in the pre-reform era—
an era in which sentencing judges had far more discretion, and even 
direct appeal offered little or no review. In the decades of change for 
 
 7. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (holding that defining a predicate 
crime of violence—for purposes of a recidivist enhancement that entails a mandatory minimum 
sentence—as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another” was void for vagueness). 
 8. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 9. Id. at 245 (holding that the Sixth Amendment rendered the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines unconstitutional and remedying that flaw by making the Guidelines advisory); see 
infra Part I.C. 
 10. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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federal sentencing, courts of appeals—and even advocates for 
mistaken career offenders—have largely overlooked these due 
process rights, which historically guaranteed an accurate basis for 
federal prisoners’ sentences. Part IV concludes by discussing the 
denial of collateral relief for mistaken career offenders in the context 
of due process in sentencing, particularly in a system in which 
sentencing is often all that matters. 
I.  THE MODERN SENTENCING SYSTEM’S EVOLUTION 
A. Sentencing Pre-Reform 
For most of the federal system’s history, judges had near-
limitless sentencing discretion as long as sentences were within 
statutory limits.11 As the Supreme Court observed, appellate review 
began “with the general proposition that once it [was] determined 
that a sentence [was] within the limitations set forth in the statute 
under which it [was] imposed, appellate review [was] at an end.”12 
Nonetheless, review was not entirely unavailable: Defendants 
could challenge sentences that were cruel and unusual13 or those 
based on constitutionally impermissible factors.14 Courts of appeals 
also corrected sentences with underlying evidentiary or procedural 
flaws.15 As the Seventh Circuit put it, “convicted defendants ha[d] a 
 
 11. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (“Before the Guidelines system, a federal 
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on 
appeal.”). 
 12. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974). 
 13. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (concluding that life imprisonment for 
passing a bad check amounted to cruel and unusual punishment). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that sex 
was an impermissible factor to justify a sentencing disparity between two codefendants). 
 15. See United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 863 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding 
that a sentence violated due process when it was based on the mistaken belief that the 
defendant had previously been convicted of armed robbery instead of just robbery); United 
States v. Ruster, 712 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[Relying] on materially false or unreliable 
information in sentencing [violates] the defendant's due process rights.”); United States v. 
Jones, 640 F.2d 284, 286 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[Supreme Court] cases recognize a due process right 
to be sentenced only on information which is accurate.”); United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 
372, 374 (1st Cir. 1976) (“[Federal habeas relief] permits collateral attacks on sentences which 
were based upon fundamental errors in evaluating the criminal defendant.”); Hess v. United 
States, 496 F.2d 936, 940 (8th Cir. 1974) (“[A] sentence based upon materially false information 
. . . could not stand.”); United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[A] 
defendant retains the right not to be sentenced on the basis of invalid premises.”); United States 
v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Misinformation or misunderstanding that is 
materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false assumptions as to any facts 
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due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate 
information.”16 
This right provided a remedy of resentencing for sentences based 
on “materially false or unreliable” information.17 Courts of appeals 
generally relied on Townsend v. Burke18 and United States v. Tucker,19 
cases in which judges sentenced uncounseled defendants based on 
misunderstood criminal histories20 or constitutionally invalid prior 
convictions.21 Although both cases involved Sixth Amendment right-
to-counsel concerns as well, these courts emphasized Townsend’s 
declaration that a sentence based on “assumptions concerning [a 
defendant’s] criminal record which were materially untrue, . . . 
whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due 
process of law.”22 Indeed, the “pronouncement of [a] sentence on a 
foundation so extensively and materially false . . . renders the 
proceedings lacking in due process.”23 
B. The Sentencing-Reform Movement 
Not only were sentences only reviewable on a limited basis,24 but 
they were also indeterminate.25 Judges were expected to hand down 
fairly long prison terms and, after prisoners served at least one-third 
 
relevant to sentencing, renders the entire sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due 
process.”). 
 16. Lane, 738 F.2d at 864. 
 17. See, e.g., Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] sentence 
will be vacated on appeal if the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2) 
demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.”). 
 18. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). 
 19. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972). 
 20. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741. In Townsend, the judge sentenced Frank Townsend after 
referencing crimes for which Townsend was adjudged not guilty. Id. at 740. 
 21. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444–45. In Tucker, the judge sentenced Forrest Tucker to twenty-
five years in prison based partly on three prior felony convictions. Id. Years later, a court 
concluded that two of the felonies were constitutionally invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963), because Tucker was unrepresented by counsel when he pleaded guilty to 
them. Tucker, 404 U.S. at 445. 
 22. Townsend, 334 U.S. at 741. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443 (1974). 
 25. See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too 
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 696–97 (2010) (recounting the 
era of indeterminate sentencing). 
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of their term, the federal Parole Commission set a release date upon 
determining the prisoner was successfully rehabilitated.26 
By the 1980s, scholars, judges, lawmakers, and the public 
recognized the considerable flaws in the “‘lawless’ process[] of 
indeterminate sentencing.”27 The federal system’s critics pointed to 
sentencing disparities for the same crime across courts, districts, and 
circuits.28 Because of parole, judges often tried to predict the Parole 
Commission’s future decisions,29 so sentences often bore little relation 
to real prison time.30 Critics sought “truth in sentencing,” whereby the 
public could realistically discern a convicted criminal’s actual jail 
time.31 Federal statutes also failed to consistently reflect the relative 
seriousness of individual crimes.32 
This discontent produced “a remarkable burst of reform”33 
culminating in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).34 The SRA 
“revolutionized the manner in which district courts sentence[d] 
persons convicted of federal crimes.”35 It created a determinate 
 
 26. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) (“Th[e] indeterminate-
sentencing system was supplemented by the utilization of parole, by which an offender was 
returned to society under the ‘guidance and control’ of a parole officer.”); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 
40 (1983) (explaining the federal system of sentencing and parole that preceded the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984); see also 45 CONG. REC. 6374 (1910) (statement of Rep. Clayton) (“The 
defendant was eligible for release on parole after serving one-third of his term.”). 
 27. KEVIN R. REITZ, Sentencing: Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1429, 1429 (Joshua Dressler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL 
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973) (describing indeterminate sentencing as “the 
absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of the sentencers to be arbitrary and 
discriminatory”). 
 28. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 (“The absence of a comprehensive Federal sentencing law 
. . . creates inevitable disparity in the sentences which courts impose on similarly situated 
defendants. This occurs in sentences handed down by judges in the same district and by judges 
from different districts and circuits in the Federal system.”). 
 29. See id. at 46 (“Sentencing judges . . . are tempted to sentence a defendant on the basis 
of when they believe the Parole Commission will release him.”). 
 30. See id. at 48 (“[J]udges need not specify the reasons for their sentencing decisions, and 
usually they do not indicate the length of time they expect an offender to spend in prison.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Truth and Fairness in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
1987, at A31 (advocating that the Sentencing Reform Act would bring transparency and clarity 
to federal sentencing). 
 32. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39 (“Current Federal law . . . specifies the maximum term of 
imprisonment and the maximum fine for each Federal offense . . . with little regard for the 
relative seriousness of the offense as compared to similar offenses.”). 
 33. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 112–13 (1993). 
 34. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 35. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 132 (1991). 
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regime based on guidelines written by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission.36 Grounded in empirical research, the Guidelines were 
intended to address the seriousness of individual crimes, account for 
defendants’ criminal history, and reduce unwarranted disparities.37 
Congress codified the Act’s guiding principles in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553.38 By its terms, § 3553 directed courts to impose sentences 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to further federal 
sentencing’s purposes.39 Those purposes included finding sentences 
that reflect the particular offense and offender and avoiding 
unwarranted disparities among similarly situated offenders.40 Under 
the SRA as originally passed, sentencing judges calculated a 
mandatory-Guidelines range and chose an appropriate sentence 
within it.41 
 
 36. Sentencing Reform Act §§ 217–218. 
 37. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 50–60 (explaining the goals and reasoning behind the 
Sentencing Guidelines); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012) (outlining the purposes of the 
Sentencing Commission, including establishing federal sentencing policies and practices that 
“provide certainty and fairness . . . [and] avoid[] unwarranted sentencing disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct”). 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012) (providing the SRA’s guiding principles). 
 39. See id. § 3553(a) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of this provision].”). 
 40. The full text of the provision details a list of the many factors courts should weigh when 
selecting a sentence. The text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) reads, 
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.—The court shall impose a 
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set 
forth [below]. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— 
  (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
  of the defendant; 
  (2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
      (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
      and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
      (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
      (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
      (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,  
      medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
  (3) the kinds of sentences available; 
  (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range [in the Sentencing 
  Guidelines] . . .  
  (5) any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . 
  (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with  
  similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
  (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
 41. See id. § 3553(a)(4) (mandating that reviewing courts consider the sentencing range as 
established by Sentencing Commission guidelines). 
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Together with meaningful appellate review, this determinate 
system sought to deliver consistent application of federal sentencing 
law and provide for punishment that accounted for specific offenses 
and individuals without disparately punishing similarly situated 
offenders.42 
C. The Federal Guidelines and the Sixth Amendment 
The first version of the Guidelines went into effect in November 
1987.43 For more than a decade, the federal sentencing system 
operated as a mandatory regime44 wherein the Sentencing Guidelines 
had “the force and effect of laws.”45 Appellate courts had the 
authority to correct sentences if judges miscalculated the Guidelines 
or unreasonably departed from them.46 
In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey47 marked the beginning of a string of Sixth Amendment cases 
that collided with the Guidelines and ultimately rendered them 
advisory.48 In Apprendi, the Court considered a hate-crime 
enhancement that increased a firearm offense’s maximum sentence 
from ten to twenty years.49 The Court held that any fact, other than a 
prior conviction, that increases a crime’s statutory maximum must be 
admitted or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.50 Because a 
jury did not find the racial-motivation factor that increased the 
Apprendi defendant’s statutory maximum, New Jersey’s hate-crime 
statute was unconstitutional.51 
 
 42. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213, 98 Stat. 1837, 2011 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1984)). 
 43. See id. § 235 (outlining the procedures for when the first guidelines would take effect); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987) (“[U]nder the 
present statute the[se guidelines] take effect automatically on November 1, 1987.”); see also 
Andrew von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 367–69 (1989) (detailing the period leading up to the Sentencing 
Commission’s first Guidelines Manual). 
 44. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (“[Congress] settl[ed] on a 
mandatory-guideline system . . . .”). 
 45. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 46. Sentencing Reform Act § 213(a). 
 47. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 48. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 248 (2005) (citing Apprendi and discussing 
subsequent advisories issued by the Department of Justice). 
 49. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
 50. Id. at 490. 
 51. Id. 
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Four years later in Blakely v. Washington,52 the Court explained 
that under Washington’s mandatory sentencing regime, the top of the 
sentencing range was the effective statutory maximum.53 Therefore, 
judge-found facts that increased a mandatory sentencing range 
violated the Sixth Amendment.54 
After Apprendi and Blakely, invalidating the mandatory federal 
Guidelines was only a short step away for the Court in Booker. On 
the facts of Freddie Booker’s federal crack-cocaine conviction, his 
Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months, but the sentencing judge 
found aggravating factors that increased that range to between 360 
months and life imprisonment.55 The judge sentenced Booker to 360 
months.56 
Booker produced two majority opinions. Five Justices (“merits 
majority”) agreed that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment because, like the state guidelines in Blakely, they 
increased authorized sentences based on judge-found facts.57 A 
separate majority (“remedial majority”) held that the remedy for the 
Guidelines’ constitutional flaw was to make them advisory.58 In an 
opinion by Justice Breyer, the remedial majority excised the portions 
of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory.59 Sentencing judges 
should still calculate the “effectively advisory” range to consider in 
light of § 3553(a).60 Rather than de novo review, courts of appeals 
would review for “unreasonableness” based on § 3553(a).61 
 
 52. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 53. Id. at 303. Ralph Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping, for which the top end of his 
mandatory-guidelines range was 53 months. Id. at 298. The judge found that Blakely had acted 
with “deliberate cruelty,” which increased his sentencing range. Id. Based on this sentence 
enhancement, the judge sentenced him to 90 months, beyond the 53-month “maximum” he 
could have received based on a guilty plea alone. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005). 
 56. Id. Notably, the sentence was above the 262-month maximum based solely on the jury 
verdict. Id. at 227. 
 57. Id. at 244. Justice Ginsburg was the only common Justice, but did not write an opinion. 
 58. Id. at 245. 
 59. Id. The Court invalidated § 3553(b)(1), which required within-range sentences, and 
§ 3742(e), which provided for de novo review, reasoning that without those provisions, the 
Guidelines were effectively advisory. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 264. 
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II.  SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER: ADVISORY GUIDELINES  
AND REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
A. Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing 
After a conviction or guilty plea, statutory provisions and the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure govern a defendant’s 
sentencing. Section 3553(d) provides that the court must give the 
parties notice, hear them on relevant matters, provide opportunities 
to address the court, and ultimately explain the sentence.62 
Rule 32 outlines the actual process.63 Sentencing begins with an 
investigation into the circumstances of the crime and into the 
defendant’s background, criminal history, and financial situation.64 
This investigation produces a presentence report (PSR),65 which 
includes a calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines range.66 
Defendants have an opportunity to object to errors after receiving the 
PSR and at sentencing.67 In arriving at a sentence, judges can consider 
a wide variety of evidence not normally admissible at trial68 and find 
facts based on a preponderance of the evidence.69 The defendant, 
 
 62. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(d) (2012). 
 63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32. 
 64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(d); see also 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, 
PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 522 (2d 
ed. 1982) (“Presentence reports are intended to provide the sentencing judge with objective and 
accurate information relating to the defendant.”). 
 65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)–(e). 
 66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1). 
 67. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(1) (“Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report 
[(PSR)], the parties must state in writing any objections, including objections to material 
information, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements contained in or omitted from 
the report.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i) (providing an opportunity at sentencing hearings for 
defendants to object to their PSR’s material and provide evidence to support the objection). 
 68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012) (“No limitation shall be placed on the information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a 
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“In determining the relevant facts, sentencing judges are not 
restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.”); see also United States v. Watts, 519 
U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (holding that a sentencing court can consider acquitted conduct); Witte v. 
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399–401 (1995) (discussing the variety of relied-upon information). 
 69. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 156 (1997) (“[A]pplication of the preponderance standard at 
sentencing generally satisfies due process.”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) 
(endorsing a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at sentencing); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (“The Commission believes that use of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process 
requirements . . . .”). 
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attorneys, and any victims also have an opportunity to address the 
court.70 
After input from the parties, the judge formulates a sentence 
sufficient, but no greater than necessary, to further the goals 
enumerated by Congress in § 3553(a). The Supreme Court has 
explained this begins with consulting a properly calculated Guidelines 
range.71 Having consulted the Guidelines range, input from the 
parties, and any other relevant facts, the court considers the § 3553(a) 
factors and determines the appropriate sentence.72 A judge may 
choose an out-of-Guidelines sentence, but must ensure the facts 
justify the degree of variance.73 
1. Calculation of the Guidelines.  The Guidelines calculation 
occupies a particularly important place in sentencing, and errors often 
translate into an inaccurate Guidelines range. Understanding the 
Guidelines’ mechanics illuminates potential errors.74 Any Guidelines 
calculation rests on the information in a jury verdict or guilty plea and 
the information gathered during the presentence investigation. Two 
factors produce the sentencing range: an offense level for the crime 
and a criminal history category for the defendant.75 Offense levels 
range from one to forty-three.76 Defendants receive criminal history 
points from zero to thirteen, which place them in a category of I to 
VI.77 A Sentencing Table grid with axes for offense level and criminal 
history ultimately yields a range of months for the defendant’s 
sentence.78 
The Guidelines Manual lays out a multistep process for 
calculating each crime’s offense level and each defendant’s criminal 
history category. The court first determines a crime’s base offense 
 
 70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4). 
 71. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting 
point and the initial benchmark.”). 
 72. Id. at 49–50. 
 73. Id. at 50. 
 74. For a helpful roadmap of the Guidelines calculation, see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20–26 (1991).  
 75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. See id. (providing the parameters for such a Table).  
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level by referring to Chapter Two.79 Chapter Two groups offenses by 
type and assigns base offense levels depending on the offense’s 
seriousness.80 The court also applies offense characteristics, which 
tailor the offense level to the seriousness of the crime.81 For example, 
the base level for obstruction-of-justice crimes is fourteen,82 which 
increases to twenty-two if the obstruction involved “causing or 
threatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property 
damage.”83 
The court then applies adjustments in Chapter Three, which 
increase or decrease the offense level depending on the crime’s 
circumstances.84 These adjustments include victim-related factors,85 
the defendant’s role in the offense,86 and increases for certain 
circumstances relating to obstructing justice.87 
The Manual outlines a process for calculating the offense level 
for defendants with multiple counts.88 This seeks to accurately account 
 
 79. See generally id. ch. 2. 
 80. Id. § 1B1.1(a)–(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 74, at 21 (“The 
starting point for sentencing an individual defendant under the guidelines system is the 
determination of the base offense level.”). Each offense type in Chapter Two lists the statutory 
provisions to which it applies. For example, section 2K1.1 is titled “Failure to Report Theft of 
Explosive Materials; Improper Storage of Explosive Materials” and groups together the 
statutory offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) (violating explosives-storage regulations), § 842(k) 
(knowingly failing to report the theft or loss of explosives from one’s stock), and § 844(b) (the 
penalty provision for the two preceding offenses). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 2K1.1. The Sentencing Manual also includes in an appendix an index of each statutory offense 
and its corresponding Chapter Two offense type. Id. app. A.  
 81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(2). 
 82. Id. § 2J1.2(a). 
 83. Id. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). 
 84. See id. ch. 3 (providing a list of adjustments based on aggravating and mitigating 
factors). 
 85. Id. ch. 3, pt. A (“Victim-Related Adjustments”); see, e.g., id. § 3A1.1 (providing for an 
increased offense level if the defendant had a hate-crime motivation or targeted a vulnerable 
victim). 
 86. Id. ch. 3, pt. B (“Role in the Offense”); see, e.g., id. § 3B1.1(b)(1) (increasing the 
offense level by four levels if the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity that 
involved five or more people); id. § 3B1.2(a) (decreasing the offense level by four levels for 
minimal participants). 
 87. Id. ch. 3, pt. C (“Obstruction and Related Adjustments”); see, e.g., id. § 3C1.2 
(increasing the offense level by two levels if the defendant recklessly endangered others during 
flight). 
 88. Id. ch. 3, pt. D (“Multiple Counts”). 
BAILEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  7:30 AM 
2016] RUN-ON SENTENCE 1489 
for the harm caused without disproportionately stacking punishment89 
or adding up punishments when they do not reflect multiple harms.90 
The court may decrease a defendant’s offense level by two levels if he 
“clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.”91 
Next is criminal history. The Guidelines determine criminal 
history by adding up points for any prior offenses, the total of which 
places the defendant in a particular category. Several enhancements 
punish defendants who exhibit criminal patterns by increasing their 
criminal history category and offense level.92 Called “Criminal History 
Overrides” in some Commission materials,93 these are the 
enhancement sections “Career Offender,”94 “Armed Career 
Criminal,”95 and “Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against 
Minors.”96 
The career offender enhancement is the most common.97 It 
applies to felony defendants with at least two convictions for a crime 
of violence98 or a controlled-substance offense.99 If applied, a 
 
 89. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (“A defendant who assaults others during a fight, 
for example, may warrant more punishment if he injures ten people than if he injures one, but 
his conduct does not necessarily warrant ten times the punishment.”). 
 90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 74, at 23 (“Some offenses . . . are so closely 
related that they result in essentially the same harm. . . . [T]he guidelines group the offenses and 
apply the offense level for the most serious offense without adding levels for the closely-related 
offenses.”). 
 91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (“Acceptance of Responsibility”). 
 92. See, e.g., id. §§ 4B1.1 (“Career Offender”), 4B1.4 (“Armed Career Criminal”), 4B1.5 
(“Repeat and Dangerous Sex Offender Against Minors”). 
 93. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, supra note 4, at 9. 
 94. Id. at 10. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Table 20: Offenders Receiving Chapter Four Criminal History Points, 2013 Sourcebook 
of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table20.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P8T9-E4Q5]. 
 98. The Guidelines define “crime of violence” as any federal or state offense punishable by 
more than one year in prison that “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 99. Id. § 4B1.1(a). The Guidelines define “controlled substance offense” as any federal or 
state offense punishable by more than one year in prison that “prohibits the manufacture, 
import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) 
or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to 
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b). 
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defendant’s criminal history increases to the highest category and his 
offense level rises proportionally to the crime’s statutory maximum.100 
For the average career offender, the recommended range more than 
doubles.101 Other than acceptance of responsibility, it also renders 
Chapter Three adjustments inapplicable.102 
After progressing through the calculation of offense level and 
criminal history, the court matches the two on the Sentencing Table 
in Chapter Five to find the recommended range.103 
Booker afforded courts the discretion to go outside this range, 
but sentences have not changed much.104 The Guidelines remain the 
“essential starting point,” with slightly more below-range sentences in 
general,105 particularly for fraud and child pornography.106 Sentences 
for drugs, firearms, and immigration have remained stable.107 The law 
governing sentences’ review on appeal, however, has developed 
dynamically. 
 
 100. See id. § 4B1.1(b) (“A career offender’s criminal history category in every case under 
this subsection shall be Category VI.”); id. ch. 5, pt. A (showing Category VI as the highest 
criminal history category). For example, if the instant offense has a statutory maximum of life, 
the defendant’s offense level would increase to thirty-seven. Id. § 4B1.1(b). Absent any other 
adjustments, his Guidelines range would be 360 months to life imprisonment. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
 101. For the average career offender who faces an increase in the final offense level and 
criminal history category, the enhancement increases the offense level from twenty-four to 
thirty-one and the criminal history from IV to VI. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: 
CAREER OFFENDERS 1 (2014). This increases the range’s low end from 77 months to 188 (an 
increase of 144 percent equal to an additional 9.25 years) and the high end from 96 months up to 
235 (an increase of 145 percent equal to an additional 11.58 years). U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. 
 102. See United States v. Johnson, 155 F.3d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Other adjustments are 
thus effectively overwritten by the magnitude of the career offender upward adjustment.”); 
United States v. Beltran, 122 F.3d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that reductions for a 
mitigating role did not apply because “[t]he career offender guideline trumps all other offense 
level adjustments . . . except[] . . . acceptance of responsibility”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
CRIMINAL HISTORY PRIMER 8 (2013) (“A career offender may receive a reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility . . . [but] other Chapter 3 adjustments may not apply.”). 
 103. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A. 
 104. For an in-depth examination of Booker’s effect on federal sentencing, see U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 28–50, 59 (2012). See also Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing 
Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–41 (2010) (reviewing interjudge 
disparity in sentencing pre-Booker, post-Booker, and during the Kimbrough/Gall period). 
 105. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 104, at 60. 
 106. Id. at 67–68. 
 107. Id. at 62–66. 
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B. Appellate Review Post-Booker: Reasonableness 
Appellate review has evolved as courts try to implement 
Booker’s “reasonableness” review. In Rita v. United States,108 the 
Supreme Court held that appellate courts may presume a within-
Guidelines sentence is reasonable.109 The Guidelines “seek to embody 
the § 3553(a) considerations, both in principle and in practice,”110 and 
“reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve 
§ 3553(a)’s objectives.”111 
The Court explained “reasonableness” in greater detail in Gall v. 
United States112 and Kimbrough v. United States.113 Despite a range of 
30 to 37 months, Brian Gall received probation because the judge 
found his intervening behavior made prison unnecessary to meet 
§ 3553(a)’s goals.114 The Eighth Circuit held that such large variances 
required “extraordinary circumstances,” and reversed.115 
The Supreme Court rejected this approach,116 emphasizing that 
all sentences should be reviewed for reasonableness “whether inside 
or outside the Guidelines range.”117 The test involves a two-step 
inquiry into procedural and substantive reasonableness.118 Procedural 
review looks for “significant procedural error[s]” like miscalculating 
or failing to calculate the Guidelines, ignoring the § 3553(a) factors, 
relying on “clearly erroneous facts,” or inadequately explaining the 
 
 108. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
 109. Id. at 347. 
 110. Id. at 350. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
 113. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
 114. Gall, 552 U.S. at 43–45. Brian Gall pleaded guilty to his involvement in an Iowa 
ecstasy-trafficking conspiracy. Id. at 41–42. Gall eventually stopped using drugs, withdrew from 
the conspiracy, graduated from college, moved to Arizona, and, to all observers, became a 
rehabilitated, productive member of society. Id. Gall was eventually indicted, pleaded guilty, 
and cooperated with authorities—although he did not have information to offer investigators to 
qualify for a substantial-assistance motion. Id. at 42–43. 
 115. Id. at 45. 
 116. The Court noted that proportional or mathematical tests of outside-range sentences 
came too close to making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 47. 
 117. Id. at 49. 
 118. Id. at 51. 
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sentence.119 If a sentence is procedurally sound, appellate courts assess 
substantive reasonableness, looking for “abuse of discretion.”120 
In Kimbrough, the judge sentenced a crack-cocaine defendant 
below his Guidelines range,121 citing the “disproportionate and unjust 
effect” of differing crack- and powder-cocaine Guidelines.122 The 
Fourth Circuit held that outside-range sentences based on policy 
disagreements were per se unreasonable.123 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that a judge may determine that the disparity yields 
a greater sentence than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s goals.124 
III.  CHALLENGING ERRORS ON DIRECT APPEAL 
Defendants challenge sentencing errors within the framework of 
Gall’s reasonableness test. This Note concerns mistakes about the 
facts, law, or process that underpin a sentence rather than attacking 
the reasonableness of sentences based on accurate factual and legal 
premises. Correcting these underlying mistakes falls under Gall’s 
procedural prong. Grave procedural errors can render the sentence 
substantively unreasonable,125 but substantive reasonableness turns on 
weighing the facts and law rather than the reliability of the facts, law, 
and process.126 
Procedural errors fall loosely into factual and legal errors. 
Factual errors include findings relied on for the Guidelines range or 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. This deferential inquiry accounts for the totality of the circumstances, considering 
the extent of any deviation from the Guidelines range but giving due deference to the district 
court’s decision to deviate. Id. 
 121. At sentencing, the defendant’s Guidelines range was 228 to 270 months, but the judge 
sentenced him to 180 months in prison and 60 months of probation. Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007). 
 122. Id. Under the Guidelines in place during Kimbrough’s sentencing, a drug dealer selling 
crack cocaine faced the same sentence as one selling 100 times more powder cocaine. Id. at 94. 
 123. Id. at 93. 
 124. Id. at 110. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[Procedural flaws] 
resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence.”); United States v. Cutler, 520 F.3d 136, 176 
(2d Cir. 2008) (determining a sentence substantively unreasonable “[g]iven the procedural 
errors, the clear factual errors, and the misinterpretations of the § 3553(a) factors”). 
 126. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[Substantive 
reasonableness is] whether a factor relied on by a sentencing court can bear the weight assigned 
to it.”). 
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§ 3355(a) evaluation, such as factually inaccurate drug quantities.127 
Legal errors include incorrect Guidelines interpretations and 
procedural flaws, such as inaccurately treating a conviction as a crime 
of violence128 or wrongly counting victims for the fraud guideline.129 
These also include oversights in the sentencing process, like a judge 
misunderstanding her authority,130 relying on improper premises,131 or 
providing insufficient reasons for a departure from the recommended 
range.132 
Other than at sentencing, direct appeal is a defendant’s main 
avenue for alleging errors. Booker excised the portion of § 3742 that 
based appellate review on the Guidelines’ mandatory nature but left 
the remaining provisions intact, including those providing for appeal 
of sentences.133 And in addition to the reasonableness standard 
(refined in Gall), unpreserved objections face plain-error analysis and 
preserved objections are still analyzed for harmless error.134 
A. Preserved Error—Harmless-Error Analysis 
When appellate courts review preserved objections, a 
combination of standards apply depending on the nature of the error. 
Courts review factual determinations for clear error and legal 
 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Galloway, 509 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) (remanding 
where the record showed no basis for the district court’s loss estimate for sentencing 
enhancement). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Sanchez, 307 F. App’x 797, 798 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(remanding where nothing in the record supported the determination that the prior offenses 
were violent crimes). 
 129. See, e.g., United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding 
where the district court misinterpreted which individuals counted as victims for enhancement 
within the fraud guideline). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Vandewege, 561 F.3d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding 
reversible error where the sentencing judge did not recognize that he had the authority to 
depart from the Guidelines based on disagreement with the ratio between crack and powder 
cocaine). 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding plain error 
necessitating remand when the judge sentenced a sex offender, in part, based on an improper 
apparent belief that the sex offender was genetically predisposed to commit sex crimes). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 675 F.3d 1021, 1026 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding 
where the sentencing judge failed to justify a sentence 169 months above the Guidelines range). 
 133. Id. at 260–61; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2012) (providing for the appeal of sentences 
“imposed in violation of the law,” “imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the 
sentencing guidelines,” or “imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline 
and is plainly unreasonable”). 
 134. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005). 
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conclusions de novo.135 Sentencing courts find facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence.136 Because relying on “clearly 
erroneous facts” is a significant procedural error,137 courts of appeals 
review factual findings for clear error.138 Legal conclusions, including 
Guidelines interpretations139 and procedures,140 are reviewed de novo. 
Harmless errors “do[] not affect substantial rights.”141 An error is 
harmless unless the sentence’s proponent shows that the sentencing 
court would impose the same sentence without the error.142 Courts 
 
 135. United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (“We review the district 
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”); United States v. 
Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 24 (1st Cir. 2013) (“We review the district court’s interpretation and 
application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error.”); United 
States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Within th[e] milieu [of reasonableness 
review], we review factual findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo.”); United 
States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2009) (“We review . . . interpretation . . . of the 
guidelines de novo and . . . factual findings for clear error.”); United States v. Lemus-Gonzalez, 
563 F.3d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error 
and its interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.”); United States v. Armstead, 552 
F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of 
discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.”). 
 136. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) (“[A]pplication of the preponderance 
standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. background (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“[P]reponderance of the 
evidence . . . meet[s] due process requirements.”). 
 137. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 692 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Sentencing 
findings are reviewed for clear error.”); United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 739 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (applying the clear-error standard to sentencing findings); United States v. 
Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 139. See, e.g., McManus, 734 F.3d at 318 (“Interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is a 
question of law that we review de novo.”). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We review the 
procedures followed by the district court de novo.”). 
 141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 
2008) (explaining that courts of appeals “will remand non-harmless procedural errors”); United 
States v. Weems, 517 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A nonharmless error in the calculation of 
the applicable guidelines range requires a reviewing court to vacate the sentence and remand 
the case for resentencing.”); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that “use of an erroneous Guidelines range will typically require reversal . . . [but] 
under certain, limited circumstances, miscalculation of the Guidelines may be harmless”). 
 142. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (explaining that remand is 
unnecessary if “the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous 
factor”); United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[A] remand is appropriate 
unless the reviewing court concludes . . . that the error did not affect the district court’s selection 
of the sentence imposed.”); United States v. Cruz-Gramajo, 570 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“Remand is not necessary if . . . the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the 
sentence imposed.”); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A 
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have found errors harmless if they would not have impacted a 
defendant’s Guidelines range.143 Some circuits have treated as 
harmless a judge’s acknowledgment of the potential error and 
explanation she would impose the same sentence regardless.144 
In practice, given clear-error review’s deferential nature, 
challenges to factual findings are difficult.145 But defendants have 
 
procedural error during sentencing is harmless if the error did not affect the district court's 
selection of the sentence imposed . . . [and] we must remand unless the proponent of the 
sentence establishes that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence 
imposed.”); United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866, 879 (7th Cir. 2009) (“An error is harmless if 
. . . [it] did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed. An error that 
changed the court’s basic framework for determining the sentence cannot be called harmless.” 
(citation omitted)); United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 939 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Harmlessness 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and the burden of making this showing 
falls on the beneficiary of the error.”); United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he party who wishes to defend the sentence [must] persuade the court of appeals that 
the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor.”); United 
States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 665 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We would not remand, . . . if the record 
indicated clearly that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it had an 
accurate understanding of its authority.”); Langford, 516 F.3d at 215 (“For the error to be 
harmless, it must be clear that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the 
sentence imposed.”). 
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that reliance 
on inadmissible evidence at sentencing for purposes of denying the defendant’s safety-valve 
motion was harmless because ample evidence supported denial); see also United States v. 
Easley, 306 F. App’x 993, 997 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to rule if the district court erred on drug 
quantity because the amount based on reliable evidence exceeded the threshold for the highest 
tier of the drug table). 
 144. See United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Where a district 
judge clearly states that he would impose the same sentence, even if he erred in calculating the 
guidelines, then any error in the calculation is harmless.”); United States v. O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 
281, 296 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where a Guidelines departure provision has been erroneously 
applied, the resulting sentence may still be procedurally reasonable if the district court has 
adequately explained it by reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”); United States v. 
Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding a judge’s erroneous application of the 
extortion-under-color-of-official-right enhancement harmless because she would have so 
enhanced the sentence based on § 3553(a) factors without the enhancement); United States v. 
Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding a sentence where the trial judge 
explained his belief that the sentence was appropriate even if he had gotten the calculations 
wrong). But see United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding nonharmless 
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously applied an 
eight-level intended loss enhancement for a counterfeit-money offense, even though the 
sentencing court stated it would have selected the same sentence without the enhancement); 
United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 432 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he district court cannot 
preemptively announce an alternative sentence under the § 3553(a) factors without first having 
determined the correct advisory guidelines range.”). 
 145. See United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 550–51 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming the district 
court’s sentencing enhancements while noting that, although the defendant’s arguments might 
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obtained relief based on factual errors in instances where their drug 
quantity was based on unreliable evidence,146 when the sentencing 
judge relied on an inaccurate record of the defendant’s previous 
deportations,147 and when the evidence did not sufficiently support148 
or plainly contradicted149 the sentencing court’s factual findings. 
For legal errors, mistaken criminal history150 and offense-level151 
enhancements have consistently amounted to reversible error, as 
 
be persuasive before a sentencing judge, the defendant could not meet the burden of showing 
clear error). 
 146. See United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 707 (7th Cir. 2013) (remanding a drug 
defendant’s case where the district court explicitly pointed out the unreliability of the drug 
quantity evidence in the PSR, but then relied on a Guidelines range based on that evidence); 
United States v. David, 681 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (remanding a drug defendant’s sentence 
where, among other things, the sentencing court did not have a lab report suggesting that the 
pills the defendant possessed were likely diluted with substances that would have decreased the 
quantity of drugs he possessed). 
 147. See United States v. Cruz-Pallares, 396 F. App’x 170, 172 (5th Cir. 2010) (remanding for 
resentencing a case in which the district court relied on clearly erroneous conclusions that the 
illegal-reentry defendant had been previously deported). 
 148. See United States v. Skys, 637 F.3d 146, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2011) (remanding for 
resentencing a case in which the evidence did not support the district court’s finding that the 
defendant defrauded ten or more victims, which carried with it a two-point offense-level 
increase); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding 
nonharmless error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court applied 
an erroneous two-level enhancement that increased the defendant’s range from a span of 24 to 
30 months to a span of 30 to 57 months, even though the ultimate sentence fell within the 
properly calculated range). 
 149. See United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless 
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court applied a four-level 
enhancement although evidence only supported a three-level enhancement); see also United 
States v. Ceballos-Amaya, 470 F. App’x 254, 265 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding nonharmless error 
where the district court based an obstruction-of-justice enhancement on the government’s 
misstatement at sentencing that the defendant’s wife had provided a false alibi for him at trial, 
although the defendant’s wife actually offered no such testimony). 
 150. See United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2013) (remanding for 
resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously applied a five-level pornography-
distribution-offense enhancement, producing a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months instead of 
the correct range of 97 to 120 months, even though the defendant’s 72-month sentence fell “well 
below the bottom of th[e] corrected range”); United States v. Viezcas-Soto, 562 F.3d 903, 908 
(8th Cir. 2009) (remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erred in its 
determination of felony status for one of the defendant’s prior convictions, and applied a 
sixteen-level criminal history enhancement because the defendant illegally reentered the United 
States having previously committed a purported felony crime of violence); United States v. 
Calderon Espinosa, 569 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error where the 
sentencing court erroneously added an additional criminal history point for the defendant's 
state loitering offense); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding 
reversible error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court erroneously 
added an extra point to the defendant’s criminal history score). 
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have erroneous career offender enhancements.152 Legal errors do not 
necessarily require resentencing; a number of courts have found them 
harmless—that is, where the record indicates the judge would have 
selected the same sentence without the error.153 But procedural errors 
that potentially subject defendants to higher sentences are not 
harmless.154 
B. Unpreserved Error—Plain-Error Analysis 
If a defendant does not challenge an error at sentencing, 
correcting that error becomes more difficult on appeal. These claims, 
 
 151. See United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible 
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court improperly denied the 
defendant a three-point offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility). 
 152. See United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 497–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding reversible 
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the defendant’s prior felony conviction did 
not qualify as a “controlled substance” conviction for purposes of the career offender 
enhancement); United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error 
and remanding for resentencing a case in which the defendant’s generic state sexual-battery 
conviction was not categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of the career offender 
enhancement); United States v. Miles, 340 F. App’x 982, 985 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible 
error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the district court inaccurately treated the 
defendant’s prior escape conviction as a crime of violence for the purposes of the career 
offender enhancement). 
 153. See United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1314 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 
sentencing court’s erroneous application of the child-pornography Guidelines for 2003, instead 
of 2002, was a harmless error because the record indicated that the court would have imposed 
the same 420-month sentence under the 2002 Guidelines); United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 
647, 657 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court erred in applying a sixteen-level criminal 
history enhancement, but stating that resentencing was not warranted because the judge stated 
that he would have imposed the same sentence without the enhancement). 
 154. See United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400–01 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding 
reversible error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing judge based an 
above-Guidelines sentence for a sex offense with a minor on speculation about the defendant’s 
past crimes and an improper prediction about a propensity for recidivism); United States v. 
Gibbs, 578 F.3d 694, 695 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error and remanding for sentencing a 
case in which the sentencing court failed to calculate a Guidelines range for supervised release); 
United States v. Dhafir, 577 F.3d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding reversible error and remanding 
for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court erroneously thought that it could not 
calculate the Guidelines ranges under multiple provisions when an ambiguous set of facts made 
it unclear which Guidelines provision applied); United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 939 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless error where the sentencing court failed to consider the relative 
force used by a sexual-assault defendant); United States v. Peña-Hermosillo, 522 F.3d 1108, 
1109 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding reversible error where the sentencing court failed to respond to a 
defendant’s objection to two disputed enhancements); United States v. Peters, 512 F.3d 787, 
788–89 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding nonharmless error where the sentencing court failed to rule on 
the defendant’s assertion that he should be given a particular sentence that credited him for 
time served). 
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like unpreserved objections at trial, face plain-error analysis.155 To 
preserve a claim of error, a party must object when the court rules or 
issues an order and provide the reasons for her objection.156 Parties 
generally forfeit unpreserved claims of error on appeal.157 Rule 52(b) 
provides a limited exception: “A plain error that affects substantial 
rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the 
court’s attention.”158 
In United States v. Olano,159 the Supreme Court laid out the now 
well-known four-pronged test for plain-error review160: (1) there must 
have been an error that the objecting party did not affirmatively 
waive,161 (2) it must be “plain” at the time of appeal,162 and (3) it must 
affect substantial rights, by (4) prejudicing the proceedings’ 
outcome.163 If the error meets these requirements, correcting it 
remains up to the judge’s discretion, exercised only when the error 
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”164 
With regard to sentencing errors, unpreserved objections to 
factual and legal errors receive the same standard of review as 
preserved objections (that is, clear error for factual errors and de 
novo review for legal errors) and must affect substantial rights.165 To 
show prejudice from sentencing errors, some courts have required 
defendants to show they would have otherwise received a more 
lenient sentence.166 Where harmless-error analysis places the burden 
 
 155. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133–34 (2009) (confirming the 
appropriateness of applying plain-error analysis when the government violates its plea-
agreement obligations, but the defendant objects for the first time on appeal). 
 156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b). 
 157. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (discussing the history and 
application of the contemporaneous-objection rule). 
 158. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
 159. United States v. Olano, 506 U.S. 725 (1993). 
 160. For an elaboration on Olano’s four-pronged test, see Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 
461, 466, 468 (1997). 
 161. Olano, 506 U.S. at 733. 
 162. Id. at 734. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 726 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). 
 165. See United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288, 293–94 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[T]he plain error 
standard imposes upon the appealing defendant the burden of showing a reasonable likelihood 
that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a different, more favorable 
sentence.”). 
 166. See United States v. Durham, 645 F.3d 883, 900 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[An] error affected 
[the defendant’s] substantial rights [if it] result[ed] in a different sentence than he otherwise 
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on the sentence’s proponent,167 plain error places it on the sentence’s 
challenger.168 
In this context, factual errors that impact a defendant’s sentence 
still merit correction. Courts of appeals have granted relief where a 
PSR included a conviction that had been dismissed,169 where the 
record contradicted a judge’s view of the defendant’s prior criminal 
activity,170 and where a third party’s criminal activity was attributed to 
the defendant.171 Relief has also been warranted where facts cited at 
sentencing simply lack enough evidentiary support.172 
Under plain-error analysis, courts of appeals have also corrected 
legal errors that contributed to an inaccurate Guidelines range. The 
Ninth Circuit remanded a sentence that, without explanation, did not 
 
would have received.”); United States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating 
that a defendant must show a “strong possibility of receiving a significantly lower sentence” in 
order to meet the fourth prong); United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(“In sentencing, an error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability the defendant would 
have received a lighter sentence but for the error.”). 
 167. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Ortiz, 741 F.3d at 293–94 (finding plain error where the sentencing judge sentenced 
a felon-in-possession defendant based on the belief he had previously been convicted of 
contempt, but the contempt charge had in fact been dismissed). 
 170. United States v. Desrosiers, 568 F. App’x 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding plain error 
where the sentencing judge mentioned that the defendant aided in preparing more than 2000 
fraudulent tax returns, when the PSR and the defendant’s own admissions only indicated that he 
had prepared seventy-nine, even though the factual error would not have altered the 
defendant’s advisory sentencing range); United States v. Griffiths, 504 F. App’x 122, 126–27 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (finding plain error where the sentencing court gave a fraud defendant an eight-level 
substantial-assistance reduction because she thought that was the greatest departure that she 
had granted in similar cases, when in reality the greatest substantial-assistance reduction she had 
given was ten levels); United States v. Gonzalez-Castillo, 562 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding 
plain error where a district judge sentenced an unlawful-entry defendant on the belief that the 
defendant had twice before entered the country illegally, but the record indicated that he had 
only once before entered the country, and had done so legally). 
 171. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding plain error where the 
sentencing judge imposed an above-Guidelines sentence based on the belief that a 
misapprehension-fraud defendant had stolen checks from a bank when, in fact, the record 
showed a third party had stolen the checks). 
 172. United States v. Figueroa-Labrada, 720 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding plain 
error where the sentencing court had failed to make factual findings about the scope of a 
defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity to determine the correct amount of drugs to 
attribute to him); United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1198–99 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding 
plain error and remanding for resentencing a case in which the sentencing court failed to make 
sufficient factual findings to support a two-level offense enhancement for reckless 
endangerment during flight); United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 475 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(finding plain error where the sentencing judge cited the defendant’s belief that the crime was 
“victimless,” but the record did not support that the defendant held such a belief). 
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credit a defendant for time served even though the error made only a 
5-month difference in a 210-month sentence.173 Reviewing courts have 
also remanded where the sentencing court simply miscalculated the 
Guidelines range by inputting the incorrect offense level174 or relying 
on bad math.175 In the context of sentencing enhancements, courts of 
appeals have granted resentencing where a sentencing judge 
erroneously treats a defendant’s prior conviction as crime of 
violence,176 where a court treats prior misdemeanors as felonies,177 or 
where the Guidelines calculation includes prior offenses that should 
have been excluded altogether.178 In particular, courts of appeals have 
granted relief under plain-error review of erroneous application of 
 
 173. United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2008). Guidelines section 
5G1.3(b)(1) provides for credit against a defendant’s sentence for time served on a state 
conviction if the conduct that resulted in that conviction contributed to the calculation of the 
defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 784; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5G1.3(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 174. See, e.g., United States v. Monghan, 409 F. App’x 872, 879 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding plain 
error where the sentencing court miscalculated the Guidelines by erroneously using an offense 
level of twenty-eight instead of twenty-five, causing the range to be 110 to 137 months instead of 
84 to 105 months); United States v. Ysassi, 282 F. App’x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding plain 
error where the sentencing court input an offense level of twenty-seven rather than twenty-six, 
resulting in a Guidelines range of 100 to 125 months, instead of 92 to 115 months). 
 175. See United States v. Lee, 288 F. App’x 264, 272 (6th Cir. 2008) (remanding a case for 
resentencing after plain-error review because the Probation Office multiplied by the incorrect 
number of checks when calculating the total loss from a fraud defendant’s crime). 
 176. See United States v. Andino-Ortega, 608 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
the sentencing judge committed plain error by erroneously treating an illegal-reentry 
defendant’s prior state conviction as a crime of violence, which subjected him to a sixteen-point 
criminal history enhancement); United States v. Ortuno-Santana, 372 F. App’x 533, 534 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (remanding a case in which the judge added offense-level points for a previous drug 
conviction that should not have been counted); United States v. Elliott, 313 F. App’x 919, 920 
(8th Cir. 2009) (finding plain error where the sentencing judge enhanced the defendant’s 
sentence based on case law treating his state conviction as a crime of violence, which an 
intervening Supreme Court decision made clear was incorrect); United States v. Gamez, 577 
F.3d 394, 401 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the sentencing court plainly erred by mistakenly 
treating the defendant’s prior conviction as a crime of violence); United States v. Diaz-Sanchez, 
307 F. App’x 797, 798 (5th Cir. 2009) (remanding a case in which the judge increased the 
defendant’s criminal history by sixteen levels based on two prior crimes of violence, although 
nothing in the record supported the determination that they were violent crimes). 
 177. See United States v. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 2014) (finding 
plain error where the sentencing court erroneously treated the defendant’s prior misdemeanors 
as felonies); United States v. Burge, 683 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding a case in 
which the sentencing court erroneously treated the defendant’s animal-cruelty offense as a 
felony). 
 178. See United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding plain error 
where the sentencing court erroneously added a criminal history point for a bail-jumping 
conviction). 
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the criminal history overrides—that is, the career offender 
enhancement,179 the armed career criminal enhancement,180 and the 
enhancement for repeat and dangerous sex offenses against minors.181 
Courts of appeals have granted relief for procedural errors, at 
least where defendants have been able show that it impacted their 
sentencing.182 Reversible procedural errors include overlooking the 
Guidelines’ concurrent sentencing instructions,183 failing to calculate 
the Guidelines,184 considering improper factors,185 failing to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors,186 and misapprehending discretion to deviate 
from the Guidelines.187 
 
 179. See United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (remanding a case in 
which the evidence was insufficient to determine that the defendant’s reckless-endangerment 
conviction was a crime of violence); United States v. Davidson, 551 F.3d 807, 808 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(remanding a case in which the court erroneously applied a career offender enhancement based, 
in part, on inaccurately treating the defendant’s “auto tampering by operation” offense as a 
crime of violence); United States v. Vasquez, 287 F. App’x 610, 611–12 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
plain error in the application of a career offender enhancement where criminal history 
information in the PSR “was not supported by judicially noticeable documentation”). 
 180. See United States v. Heikes, 525 F.3d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying erroneously an 
armed career criminal enhancement based on inaccurate treatment of drunk-driving offenses). 
 181. See United States v. Sebolt, 554 F. App’x 200, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding a case 
because the court applied a repeat-and-dangerous-sex-offender-against-minors enhancement 
based on a predicate offense that did not qualify); United States v. Jeffries, 569 F.3d 873, 877 
(8th Cir. 2009) (finding that the sentencing court plainly erred by erroneously treating a prior 
sexual offense as a predicate crime). 
 182. See, e.g., United States v. Highgate, 521 F.3d 590, 595–96 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding plain 
error where the sentencing court effectively treated the Guidelines as mandatory and the record 
reflected the judge’s apparent desire to give the defendant a more lenient sentence). 
 183. See United States v. Dooley, 688 F.3d 318, 321 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that it amounted 
to reversible plain error when a judge imposed consecutive sentences for identity theft but failed 
to consider the Guidelines’ note regarding concurrent versus consecutive sentences). 
 184. See United States v. Dulay, 505 F. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding sentencing 
court’s failure to calculate the sentencing range was a plain error that required resentencing). 
 185. See United States v. Cordery, 656 F.3d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that the 
sentencing court committed plain error by extending the defendant’s sentence an extra 5 
months so he could complete a rehabilitation program while in prison); United States v. Cossey, 
632 F.3d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that the sentencing court plainly erred when it 
sentenced a possession-of-child-pornography offender, and citing the judge’s unproven beliefs 
about the genetics of sex offenders and consumers of child pornography); In re Sealed Case, 573 
F.3d 844, 853 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding plain error where drug rehabilitation served as the 
sentencing judge’s reason for extending the prison term). 
 186. See United States v. Waknine, 543 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding plain error, in 
light of Gall, where the sentencing judge did not discuss § 3553(a) factors at sentencing or in the 
statement of reasons). 
 187. See United States v. Van Putten, 282 F. App’x 950, 953 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district 
court did not fully appreciate the extent of its discretion to deviate from the Guidelines.” 
(quoting United States v. Regalado, 518 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2008))). 
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C. Correcting Sentences Based on Due Process Claims 
A separate group of post-Booker cases correct sentencing errors 
based on due process violations reviewed for harmless or plain error. 
In United States v. Corona-Gonzalez,188 a sentencing judge plainly 
erred by relying on an inaccurate record of the defendant’s previous 
deportations.189 The sentencing judge cited deterring future violations 
as a “salient factor” in the high Guidelines range.190 
After finding plain error, the Ninth Circuit underscored that the 
error affected the defendant’s substantial rights because of its due 
process implications: 
It is established firmly that ‘convicted defendants have a due process 
right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate and reliable 
information.’ If the district court did indeed sentence Mr. Corona-
Gonzalez based on a fact not supported by the record, it would 
deprive Mr. Corona-Gonzalez of this right.191 
In United States v. Ortiz,192 the First Circuit recently reviewed a 
sentence for which the defendant’s criminal history category included 
two points for a contempt conviction that was previously dismissed.193 
The court remanded for resentencing because “[d]ue process 
‘guarantees every defendant a right to be sentenced upon information 
which is not false or materially incorrect,’” and allowing “such 
erroneous information [to] materially influence[] the sentencing 
calculus” would undermine the integrity of that process.194 
The Sixth Circuit recently used similar reasoning in United States 
v. Wilson,195 where the sentencing court stated that a bank-fraud 
defendant’s theft of money orders and bank checks was an important 
factor in the sentence, but the record showed that a third party stole 
 
 188. United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 189. Id. at 340–41. During sentencing, the judge referred three times to the fact that the 
defendant had been previously deported, a fact which was untrue and unsupported in the 
record. Id. at 341. 
 190. Id. at 342. 
 191. Id. at 343 (quoting United States v. Kovic, 830 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
 192. United States v. Ortiz, 741 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 193. Id. at 291. The erroneous inclusion of the two criminal history points caused the 
defendant’s Guidelines range to be 21 to 27 months, when it should have been 15 to 21 months. 
Id. After stating that the defendant’s actions—a felon-in-possession conviction—warranted a 
small upward variance, the judge sentenced him to 36 months in prison. Id. at 290–91. 
 194. Id. at 295 (quoting United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 195. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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the items rather than the defendant.196 The court exercised its 
discretion to correct plain error given “the general rule that a 
violation of due process exists when a sentencing judge relies upon 
erroneous information.”197 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit recently applied a similar approach to a 
sentence that relied on tenuous facts.198 At former prison guard Brian 
McGowan’s sentencing for assaulting inmates, the judge considered 
unreliable out-of-court remarks claiming McGowan sold and used 
drugs.199 The judge’s comments indicated the evidence materially 
impacted McGowan’s sentence.200 The Ninth Circuit applied a two-
pronged test to determine whether the proceedings violated 
McGowan’s due process rights.201 McGowan could show a violation if 
the drug allegations were “(1) false or unreliable, and (2) 
demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.”202 The court found the 
allegations insufficiently reliable because nothing in the record 
supported them and the sentencing judge made no attempt to verify 
them.203 Upon finding that the sentence was materially impacted, the 
Ninth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing.204 
These cases show how inaccurate or unreliable information that 
serves as an input for a sentence or the sentence’s Guidelines range 
can infect the proceedings so as to amount to a violation of due 
process. 
IV.  CHALLENGING ERRORS ON COLLATERAL REVIEW 
After the appeals process runs its course, a defendant’s 
conviction and sentence ultimately become final. At that point, if a 
federal prisoner wants to bring a sentencing-error claim, the vehicle is 
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Congress created the provision to provide a habeas 
remedy for federal prisoners in the district court that convicted and 
sentenced them.205 Claims brought under § 2255 face different 
 
 196. Id. at 223–24. 
 197. Id. at 225 (quoting Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 198. United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606–09 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 199. Id. at 603–04. 
 200. Id. at 608 (noting that the judge said the drug issues were “unforgivable”). 
 201. Id. at 606. 
 202. Id. (quoting United States v. Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 203. Id. at 606–08. 
 204. Id. at 609.  
 205. For a discussion of the history and purpose of § 2255, see United States v. Hayman, 342 
U.S. 205, 210–19 (1952). The Hayman Court explained that § 2255 affords federal prisoners a 
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standards from Gall claims on direct appeal. Under § 2255, federal 
prisoners may move to vacate, set aside, or correct their sentence for 
(1) sentences “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States,” (2) when the trial court lacked jurisdiction, (3) 
sentences exceeding the statutory maximum authorized, and (4) 
sentences otherwise subject to collateral attack.206 
Section 2255 also includes several important limitations. First, 
there are several procedural barriers, mostly creations of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).207 
With AEDPA, Congress amended § 2255 to include a one-year 
limitations period, with several narrow exceptions,208 and to include 
limits on second or successive § 2255 petitions.209 The Supreme Court 
has also limited “cognizable” nonconstitutional claims to those 
alleging “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice” or “an omission inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure.”210 
A. The “Miscarriage of Justice” Gateway 
Before examining appellate courts’ treatment of errors, a more 
in-depth understanding of the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
“miscarriage of justice” standard is useful to put sentencing errors on 
collateral review in context. The Court has not extensively defined 
 
habeas remedy in the sentencing court because, until that point, federal prisoners directed their 
habeas petitions to courts that happened to be in districts in which federal prisons were located. 
Id. at 217 n.25 (citing a Statement, prepared by then–Circuit Judge Stone, submitted to 
Congress on behalf of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure). This 
resulted in an overwhelming volume of habeas petitions in those courts, id., leading Congress to 
provide for habeas consideration in the trial and sentencing court so as “to meet practical 
difficulties that had arisen in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts,” 
id. at 219. 
 206. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). 
 207. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 105, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012)). 
 208. The limitations period, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), runs from the latest date of (1) 
the date a prisoner’s judgment becomes final; (2) the date on which an illegal or 
unconstitutional government impediment to the prisoner making the motion is removed; (3) the 
prisoner’s assertion of a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the subsequent discovery of supporting facts that 
were otherwise undiscoverable through due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2)–(4). 
 209. See id. § 2255(h) (allowing successive motions only if they are certified by the court of 
appeals and either contain newly discovered evidence likely to prove innocence by clear and 
convincing evidence, or rely on a new, previously unavailable constitutional rule made 
retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court). 
 210. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). 
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the contours of what amounts to a miscarriage of justice in general, 
much less in the context of sentencing errors, but its cases addressing 
§ 2255 provide some guidance. In Hill v. United States,211 the Court 
held that failure to inform a defendant of his allocution rights at 
sentencing was not cognizable.212 The Court emphasized that the 
defendant was not affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak at the 
sentencing hearing, that there was no suggestion the judge was 
“misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstance[],” and 
that the defendant did not claim he necessarily would have had 
something to say if given the opportunity.213 
An intervening change in substantive law that renders conduct 
no longer criminal is cognizable.214 In Davis v. United States,215 a 
California court convicted Joseph Davis of failure to report for 
induction to the armed forces following several unanswered orders by 
a local draft board.216 Intervening decisions in the Ninth Circuit and 
the Supreme Court showed that the draft board was not statutorily 
authorized to declare Davis delinquent in the first place.217 Without 
elaborating, the Court reasoned that if a prisoner’s punishment is for 
something the law does not make criminal, “[t]here can be no room 
for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a complete 
miscarriage of justice and presents exceptional circumstances that 
justify [§ 2255] collateral relief.”218 Although an intervening change in 
substantive law that changes the criminality of a defendant’s initial 
conduct is cognizable, the Court has not decided whether errors that 
substantively affect the defendant’s sentence are. 
Since Davis, the Court has ruled that violations of certain 
procedural rules generally do not merit relief. In United States v. 
Timmreck,219 a judge’s acceptance of a defendant’s guilty plea failed to 
inform the defendant of a special-parole term that he was entitled to 
know under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but 
 
 211.  Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). 
 212. In Hill, the defendant moved to vacate his sentence, claiming § 2255 entitled him to a 
new sentence because the sentencing judge denied him the right to speak on his own behalf at 
sentencing, a violation of Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 426. 
 213. Id. at 429. 
 214. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346–47 (1974). 
 215. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). 
 216. Id. at 336. 
 217. Id. at 337–40. 
 218. Id. at 346–47. 
 219. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). 
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the Court ruled the oversight was not cognizable.220 The defendant’s 
allegation of a “technical violation” did not claim “he was actually 
unaware of the special parole term or that . . . he would not have 
pleaded guilty.”221 But the Court noted relief might be available “in 
the context of other aggravating circumstances.”222 
In United States v. Addonizio,223 the Court held that a federal 
prisoner’s claim was not cognizable when he argued that changes to 
federal parole policies that came after the judge sentenced him 
prolonged the sentence beyond what the judge intended.224 The 
change in parole policies did not “infect [the sentence] with any error 
of fact or law of the ‘fundamental’ character that renders the entire 
proceeding irregular and invalid,” nor was the sentence “based on 
‘misinformation of constitutional magnitude.’”225 The error was 
“based not on any objectively ascertainable error but on the 
frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge.”226 
The Court also declined to recognize a claim when authorities 
did not charge a federal defendant within the period set forth in a 
federal–state prisoner-transfer agreement.227 In Reed v. Farley,228 the 
Court held that the defendant, Orrin Scott Reed, did not have a 
cognizable claim because he “registered no objection . . . and suffered 
no prejudice.”229 Like Hill and Timmreck, the case lacked the 
“aggravating circumstances [that] render[] the need for the remedy 
afforded by the writ of habeas corpus apparent.”230 
 
 220. Id. at 782–83. 
 221. Id. at 784. 
 222. Id. at 784–85. 
 223. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979). 
 224. Id. at 190. 
 225. Id. at 186–87. 
 226. Id. at 187. 
 227. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). In Reed, authorities transferred a federal prisoner, 
Orrin Scott Reed, from federal to state custody. Id. at 342. Authorities executed his transfer 
under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), 18 U.S.C. App. § 2, a compact among 
forty-eight states and the federal government for transferring prisoners facing charges in 
another jurisdiction. Id. at 341. Among other things, the IAD included a speedy-trial provision 
requiring prisoners be tried within 120 days, and that charges be dismissed with prejudice if a 
trial did not occur within that time period. Id. at 341–42. Reed brought his challenge under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas remedy for state prisoners, id. at 342, which the Court noted 
involves the same “fundamental defect” test as § 2255, id. at 353–54. 
 228. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). 
 229. Id. at 342. 
 230. Id. at 350 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted)). 
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Finally, failure to inform a defendant of his right to appeal his 
sentence is not cognizable if the defendant already knows of his 
appeal rights and suffers no prejudice from the oversight.231 In 
Peguero v. United States,232 the petitioner argued his sentencing 
violated Rule 32(a)’s requirement that the court advise defendants of 
“any right to appeal the sentence.”233 The Court held that the 
violation was not cognizable because an evidentiary hearing revealed 
Peguero “knew of his right and hence suffered no prejudice from the 
[sentencing court’s] omission.”234 
B. Error Correction on Collateral Review 
Dating back to before Booker, courts of appeals generally held 
that ordinary Guidelines misapplications were not cognizable.235 
Ordinary factual and legal errors correctable on direct appeal no 
longer merited resentencing once a sentence has become final. 
The courts of appeals appear to agree, however, that claims pass 
the cognizability test if an erroneous sentencing enhancement caused 
a prisoner to be sentenced above the maximum sentence otherwise 
authorized by statute.236 The Supreme Court has also made clear that 
 
 231. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24 (1999). 
 232. Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999). 
 233. Id. at 26 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)). 
 234. Id. at 24. 
 235. See Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding cognizable 
on collateral review a challenge by a prisoner whose Guidelines rested on an obstruction-of-
justice enhancement that a subsequent Guidelines amendment made clear was wrong); United 
States v. Payne, 99 F.3d 1273, 1281–82 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a prisoner’s claim that 
the sentencing court inappropriately denied him an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and 
erred calculating his drug quantity was not cognizable, because an improper application of the 
Guidelines is a nonconstitutional issue that could have been raised on direct appeal and is not 
cognizable on collateral review); Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam) (concluding that a fine imposed in excess of the Guidelines’ allowable maximum 
was not cognizable on collateral review when the defendant failed to raise it on direct appeal); 
Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[O]rdinary questions of guideline 
interpretation falling short of the ‘miscarriage of justice’ standard do not present a proper 
section 2255 claim.”); Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 773 (1st Cir. 1994) (concluding that 
the sentencing court’s erroneous addition of two criminal history points did not amount to a 
“miscarriage of justice” because the defendant’s sentence fell within corrected Guidelines range 
and defendant had ample opportunity to raise the issue of direct appeal); United States v. 
Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Nonconstitutional claims that could have been 
raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding.”). 
 236. See Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (granting relief where 
Begay error led defendant to be sentenced above what would otherwise have been the statutory 
maximum without his armed career criminal enhancement); Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 
621, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2012) (granting § 2255 relief where Begay made clear prisoner’s prior 
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vacatur of an enhancement’s predicate offense warrants 
resentencing.237 
1. Erroneous Career Offender Enhancements.  What if a judge 
sentences a defendant as a career offender, and a subsequent 
Supreme Court decision makes clear that the predicate crimes no 
longer count? Several recent cases have rejected such claims. These 
cases generally derive from decisions that narrow the scope of 
offenses qualifying as “violent felonies” for sentencing purposes: the 
Supreme Court excluded driving under the influence, escape based on 
failure to report, and battery based on mere offensive touching from 
the list of violent felonies.238 The Fourth Circuit also recently 
reinterpreted the way courts treat state drug crimes,239 leading some 
prisoners sentenced as career offenders to face sentences that they 
would not face today.240 And the uncertainty shows no signs of 
stopping. In the 2015 case Johnson v. United States,241 the Court struck 
down a statutory enhancement provision of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), which imposes mandatory minimums 
for recidivists with certain enumerated violent felonies or felonies 
covered by the so-called residual clause—those that “otherwise 
involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”242 The Court struck down the residual clause’s 
 
offenses were not violent felonies, and his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum he would 
have faced without the armed career criminal enhancement that relied on those prior offenses); 
United States v. Williams, 396 F. App’x 951, 952 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (granting § 2255 
relief when Begay made prisoner’s sentence as armed career criminal sentence above the 
statutory maximum without the enhancement). 
 237. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 302 (2005) (holding that vacatur of a state 
conviction is grounds for challenging an enhanced sentence, and that it tolls the statute of 
limitations in § 2255 so long as the prisoner has diligently pursued his rights). 
 238. See Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010) (holding that element of 
“actually and intentionally touching” under Florida’s battery law did not necessarily make the 
offense a “violent felony”); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 123 (2009) (holding that 
an escape conviction based on a failure to report is not a “violent felony”); Begay v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008) (holding that a drunk-driving conviction is not a “violent 
felony”). 
 239. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that 
defendant’s first-time marijuana possession did not qualify as a predicate-felony conviction for 
purposes of Controlled Substances Act). 
 240. See Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (declining to 
address petitioner’s arguments that his sentence should be vacated post-Simmons because prior 
drug offenses would not qualify as predicate-felony convictions). 
 241. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 242. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). 
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language as unconstitutionally vague because “[i]nvoking so shapeless 
a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does 
not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due process.”243 
Violent predicates for the career offender enhancement include a 
provision identical to the one struck down in Johnson.244 The Court’s 
decision introduces even greater uncertainty for prisoners sentenced 
as career offenders whose enhancement may be based on 
unconstitutionally vague language. 
For prisoners claiming their sentences rest on legally mistaken 
designations as career offenders, the courts of appeals have generally 
denied these prisoners collateral relief. In Sun Bear v. United States,245 
defendant Marlon Dale Sun Bear received a 360-month sentence 
based on a Guidelines range of 360 months to life.246 Based partially 
on a prior conviction for attempted auto theft, Sun Bear’s Guidelines 
included a career offender enhancement based on an attempted-auto-
theft conviction that he unsuccessfully challenged on direct appeal.247 
Six years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United 
States248 led the Eighth Circuit to conclude that auto theft was not a 
“crime of violence”249 and Sun Bear challenged his sentence in a 
§ 2255 motion. An en banc Eighth Circuit reasoned that Sun Bear’s 
claim was not cognizable because the erroneous career offender 
designation did not entail “a fundamental defect which inherently 
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”250 In reaching that 
conclusion, the court emphasized Sun Bear’s sentence was within the 
statutory maximum authorized by statute,251 and he could receive the 
 
 243. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 244. See U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“The 
term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”). 
 245. Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 246. Id. at 702. 
 247. Id. Without the career offender enhancement, his range would have been 292 to 365 
months.  
 248. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
 249. United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 975–76 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 250. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 704 (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 
(1979)). 
 251. Sun Bear pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, for which the maximum punishment 
when Sun Bear faced sentencing was life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2012) 
(“Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or 
for life.”). 
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same punishment were his case vacated for resentencing.252 The court 
limited relief under the miscarriage-of-justice test to an intervening 
change in law that makes the prisoner’s conduct lawful or new 
evidence suggesting the prisoner was actually innocent of the crime.253 
The Eleventh Circuit has twice considered challenges to career 
offender enhancement based on subsequent reinterpretation of 
predicate offenses. In Gilbert v. United States,254 Ezell Gilbert pleaded 
guilty to crack-cocaine and marijuana trafficking, and was sentenced 
as a career offender.255 One of his predicate crimes was carrying a 
concealed weapon, which he unsuccessfully challenged at sentencing 
and on direct appeal.256 The next year he filed a § 2255 petition 
challenging other aspects of his sentence.257 After Begay led the 
Eleventh Circuit to exclude his crime from the violent-felony list, he 
brought another § 2255 challenge.258 The Eleventh Circuit denied 
Gilbert’s petition based on § 2255(h)’s prohibition on successive 
motions.259 
The Eleventh Circuit recently went further in Spencer v. United 
States260 and ruled that a prisoner in Gilbert’s situation could not 
challenge an erroneous career offender enhancement even in a timely 
§ 2255 petition.261 In Spencer, defendant Kevin Spencer pleaded guilty 
to distributing cocaine and faced a career offender enhancement 
based on previous convictions for child abuse and selling cocaine.262 
He unsuccessfully challenged the designation of his conviction for 
child abuse as a crime of violence on direct appeal.263 Two weeks later, 
the Supreme Court decided Begay, causing Spencer to challenge his 
 
 252. Sun Bear, 644 F.3d at 705. 
 253. Id. at 706. 
 254. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 255. Id. at 1299. Gilbert’s Guidelines range was 292 to 365 months, but would have been 151 
to 188 months without the career offender status. Id. at 1303. 
 256. Id. at 1300–01. 
 257. Id. at 1301. 
 258. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 259. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307–08. The court also held that Guidelines miscalculations cannot 
be challenged via § 2255’s savings clause. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) (outlining 
provisions of the savings clause). 
 260. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 261. Id. at 1135. 
 262. Id. The enhancement increased Spencer’s Guidelines range from a span of 70 to 87 
months to a span of 151 to 180 months, and the judge eventually sentenced him to 151 months in 
prison. Id. at 1148. 
 263. Id. at 1136. 
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sentence in a § 2255 motion.264 A panel initially granted Spencer’s 
petition, but an en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that § 2255 
did not provide relief for sentencing errors unless a prisoner could 
prove innocence or vacatur of a predicate offense.265 The court 
reasoned that even if Spencer were not a career offender, his sentence 
fell below the statutory maximum and was lawful.266 The court also 
relied on the Guidelines’ advisory nature, which allows the sentencing 
court to impose the same sentence on remand.267 The court also 
emphasized the importance of finality to deterrence and the efficient 
operation of the criminal justice system.268 
The Seventh Circuit has wrestled with the cognizability of 
erroneous career offender enhancements as well. In Narvaez v. 
United States,269 the defendant was sentenced as a career offender 
based on two prior escape convictions for failure to return to 
confinement. Despite the defendant’s sentence being within statutory 
limits, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that his career offender 
categorization was “the lodestar” to the court’s Guidelines 
calculation.270 As a result, the court found the intervening clarification 
of law made Narvaez’s sentence illegal and “constitute[d] a 
miscarriage of justice, entitling him to relief.”271 
Narvaez was sentenced pre-Booker, when the Sentencing 
Guidelines were mandatory, and the Seventh Circuit went on to hold 
that claims by prisoners sentenced after Booker are not cognizable.272 
In Hawkins v. United States,273 the court reasoned that erroneous 
enhancements under the advisory regime are “less serious,” and do 
not constitute a miscarriage of justice as long as the sentence was 
below the statutory maximum.274 The Hawkins court reasoned that 
the sentencing judge would likely have sentenced Hawkins similarly 
 
 264. Id.  
 265. Spencer, 773 F.3d at 1139 (“A prisoner may challenge a sentencing error as a 
‘fundamental defect’ on collateral review when he can prove that he is either actually innocent 
of his crime or that a prior conviction used to enhance his sentence has been vacated, but 
Spencer’s motion alleges nothing of the kind.”). 
 266. Id. at 1139. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1144. 
 269. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 270. Id. at 629. 
 271. Id. at 630. 
 272. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 273. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 274. Id. at 824. 
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without the career offender enhancement.275 The Hawkins court also 
heavily emphasized finality, stating that the Supreme Court’s 
miscarriage-of-justice cases strike a balance between finality and the 
injustice of a possibly mistaken sentence, which excludes relief for 
sentencing errors once a sentence is final.276 
The story is the same in the Fourth Circuit. In a pair of cases, the 
Fourth Circuit has ruled that a mistaken designation as a career 
offender is not a sufficiently serious mistake to either toll § 2255’s 
period of limitations277 or clear the seemingly insurmountable 
miscarriage-of-justice hurdle.278 In Whiteside v. United States,279 
DeAngelo Whiteside’s career offender enhancement relied on a state 
crime that the Fourth Circuit clarified in United States v. Simmons280 
should have been treated as a misdemeanor.281 Whiteside challenged 
his sentence in a § 2255 motion more than one year after his 
conviction became final.282 The Fourth Circuit held his motion was not 
timely.283 The limitations period tolls if a petition relies on a new, 
previously undiscoverable fact, but, on the court’s reasoning, 
Simmons was not a new fact for purposes of the limitations 
provision.284 The court also held that the limitations period should not 
be equitably tolled.285 The prospect that Whiteside’s petition would be 
denied in a claim brought before Simmons did not rise to the 
“extraordinary circumstances” contemplated by the test for tolling.286 
 
 275. Id. at 823. 
 276. Id. at 825. 
 277. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 278. United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931, 932 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 279. Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 280. United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 281. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 182. Whiteside faced a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months, 
which included a career offender enhancement based on two state drug crimes. Id. Following a 
government motion for a departure based on substantial assistance, the judge sentenced 
Whiteside to 210 months in prison. Id. 
 282. Id. Whiteside waived his right to appeal in his plea agreement. Whiteside v. United 
States, 748 F.3d 541, 545 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 283. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 182. 
 284. Id. at 184; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) (2012) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall 
apply to a motion under this section. . . . [It] shall run from the date on which the facts 
supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of 
due diligence.”). 
 285. Under Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the limitations period of § 2255 may be 
equitably tolled when “(1) [the prisoner] has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) . . . 
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649. 
 286. Whiteside, 775 F.3d at 185. 
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The court did not answer the question of whether such an error 
amounted to a miscarriage of justice. 
The Fourth Circuit did answer that question in United States v. 
Foote,287 and its answer was no.288 In Foote, Wesley Foote appealed his 
262-month sentence for distribution of crack cocaine.289 Because of a 
Simmons error, the sentencing court had mistakenly categorized 
Foote as a career offender, causing his Guidelines range to nearly 
double: from a span of 151 to 188 months to a span of 262 to 327 
months.290 The Fourth Circuit nonetheless ruled that the error was not 
cognizable.291 The court reasoned that the other instances amounting 
to a miscarriage of justice addressed claims of actual innocence,292 that 
the Guidelines’ advisory nature could render an equally harsh 
sentence on remand,293 and that deeming a Guidelines error 
cognizable would be unworkable without a clean limiting principle. 
2. Error Correction on Due Process Grounds.  The preceding 
cases imply there is no collateral remedy for sentencing errors other 
than for sentences that exceed statutory maximums and for vacatur of 
predicate convictions. But several appellate courts have granted 
resentencing for similar errors based on due process challenges dating 
back to the pre-reform era. In United States v. Malcolm,294 the Second 
Circuit granted § 2255 relief when the judge misapprehended the 
defendant’s criminal record and refused to hear evidence of the 
defendant’s cooperation.295 The court remanded based on the 
principle that “[m]isinformation or misunderstanding that is 
materially untrue regarding a prior criminal record, or material false 
assumptions as to any facts relevant to sentencing, renders the entire 
sentencing procedure invalid as a violation of due process.”296 
 
 287. United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 288. Id. at 940. 
 289. Id. at 932. 
 290. Id. at 933. 
 291. Id. at 940. 
 292. Id. at 940–41. 
 293. Id. at 941–43. 
 294. United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 295. Id. at 818. The sentencing judge thought a bank-robbery defendant had previously 
pleaded guilty to two of four state robbery indictments. Id. at 815. The defendant had pleaded 
guilty to one consolidated charge, and three others were dismissed. Id. at 815–16. His second 
guilty plea was to a fifth robbery charge that had been reduced to petty larceny. Id. at 816. 
 296. Id. at 816. 
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In United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane,297 the Seventh Circuit 
heard an appeal from a sentence in which the judge mistakenly 
believed the defendant had a previous conviction for armed robbery 
where the previous conviction was actually for robbery.298 Relying on 
Townsend v. Burke and United States v. Tucker, the court explained 
that “a sentence must be set aside where the defendant can show that 
false information was part of the basis for the sentence.”299 
This same reasoning led courts to grant habeas relief after the 
SRA. In Shukwit v. United States,300 the Eleventh Circuit granted 
§ 2255 relief to a defendant whose PSR inaccurately labeled him a 
principal in the drug scheme for which he had pleaded guilty.301 At 
sentencing, he disputed the report, but the court never made a 
finding.302 The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that “due process 
protects the right not to be sentenced on the basis of false 
information,” and confirmed that “Shukwit’s claim that he was 
sentenced on the basis of false information contained in the [PSR] is 
cognizable in this petition.”303 
The Third Circuit most comprehensively engaged the 
intersection of habeas relief and defendants’ due process rights at 
sentencing. In United States v. Eakman,304 a defendant pleaded guilty 
to anabolic-steroids and money-laundering charges.305 The judge 
sentenced Eakman to one year and a day in prison, with a 
recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons that Eakman serve his 
sentence at a community corrections center (that is, a halfway 
house).306 A month into his sentence, a Justice Department memo 
concluded the Bureau lacked legal authority to assign prisoners to 
halfway houses while under a term of imprisonment and the Bureau 
accordingly transferred Eakman to prison.307 He brought a habeas 
motion under § 2255 claiming the sentencing judge did not accurately 
 
 297. United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 298. Id. at 866. 
 299. Lane, 738 F.2d at 865. 
 300. Shukwit v. United States, 973 F.2d 903 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
 301. Id. at 904. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. United States v. Eakman, 378 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 305. Id. at 296. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
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understand the law governing the Bureau’s legal authority.308 The 
Third Circuit held that the circumstances Eakman alleged would, if 
true, violate due process, and if a hearing showed such circumstances 
existed Eakman deserved resentencing under an accurate 
understanding of the Bureau’s legal authority.309 
The court explained that “due process clearly guarantees all 
defendants the right to be sentenced under an accurate understanding 
of the law.”310 Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Addonizio decision 
as excluding sentencing errors that are not “objectively ascertainable” 
from collateral relief, the court applied a two-part test for correcting 
sentencing errors on collateral review that requires showing 
(1) the district court made an objectively ascertainable error (one 
that does not require courts to probe the mind of the sentencing 
judge) and (2) the district court materially relied on that error in 
determining the appropriate sentence.311 
Applying this test, the Third Circuit concluded the judge’s 
misperception of the Bureau of Prisons’ authority was “objectively 
ascertainable.”312 The court ordered a hearing to determine the extent 
to which the judge’s “legal misapprehension” impacted Eakman’s 
sentence, and if it did, the court said, it amounted to a due process 
violation that merited resentencing.313 In so ruling, the opinion 
emphasized that “it is hard to imagine how a sentence could ever be 
deemed fair when there is some way to verify the sentencing court’s 
error externally (whether an error of fact or an error of law) and 
when that error caused the misguided sentence.”314 Eakman holds 
particular significance, not only because it recognizes pre-SRA 
conceptions of due process rights to accurate sentencing, but also 
because it shows those principles survive AEDPA. 
C. Erroneous Career Offender Enhancements in Context 
Where does this leave federal inmates serving career offender 
enhanced sentences who would not face such severe Guidelines 
ranges today? The courts of appeals have been fairly clear that an 
 
 308. Id. at 300–01. 
 309. Id. at 296. 
 310. Id. at 302. 
 311. Id. at 301. 
 312. Id. at 303. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 300–01. 
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erroneous career offender enhancement is correctable on direct 
appeal under harmless and plain-error analysis.315 But for the majority 
of career offenders, collateral attack is the only vehicle available to 
raise their claims unless the Supreme Court fortuitously takes a case 
reinterpreting predicate felonies before their sentence becomes final. 
Once it is final, the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held 
that the error simply lacks the severity required for § 2255 to 
recognize it. In the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, that applies even if 
the defendant raised the argument on direct appeal. The Fourth 
Circuit left open the possibility that a timely claim could be 
cognizable, but held that claims brought after that period are 
untimely and are insufficiently extraordinary to merit tolling the 
limitations period. 
The functional result of these decisions is a procedural quagmire 
for erroneously sentenced career offenders. In the cases of Sun Bear 
and Spencer, the defendants correctly asserted from the beginning 
that they were not career offenders.316 In Hawkins, the Seventh 
Circuit said such errors are correctable on direct appeal,317 but given 
the futility of direct appeal in Sun Bear and Spencer it would appear 
no remedy exists at any stage. And direct appeal is unavailable to the 
large group of defendants who waive appeal rights as part of plea 
agreements.318 
The reasoning in Sun Bear, Hawkins, and Spencer is difficult to 
reconcile with the principles emanating from caselaw on due process 
in sentencing. If due process does, as the Eakman court put it, 
“clearly guarantee[] all defendants the right to be sentenced under an 
accurate understanding of the law,”319 it is hard to see how the federal 
system affords erroneously sentenced career offenders due process. 
In fact, the Eakman court’s interpretation of Supreme Court 
§ 2255 jurisprudence articulates a much more workable rule—one 
 
 315. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 639 F.3d 489, 497–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding 
reversible error); United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding plain error). 
 316. Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 2014); Sun Bear v. United 
States, 644 F.3d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 317. Hawkins v. United States, 706 F.3d 820, 824 (2013) (“An erroneous computation of an 
advisory guidelines sentence is reversible (unless harmless) on direct appeal; it doesn't follow 
that it’s reversible years later in a postconviction proceeding.”). 
 318. See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 127, 
130 (1995) (discussing the rise in popularity of appeals waivers on the part of federal 
prosecutors). 
 319. Eakman, 378 F.3d at 302. 
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that bases relief on whether the error is (1) objectively ascertainable, 
and (2) materially relied upon at sentencing.320 This mirrors the test 
for due process violations dating back to the pre-reform era321 and 
recently employed by the Ninth Circuit in McGowan.322 The second 
prong also reflects the Supreme Court’s own cognizability cases, 
which explain that lack of prejudice or “aggravating circumstances” is 
what undermines cognizability.323 
The decisions denying relief to mistaken career offenders 
emphasize the interest in finality.324 Arguments favoring finality often 
cite preservation of judicial resources, concerns about stale evidence, 
and harm to victims of prolonged litigation.325 But these concerns hold 
less weight in the context of correcting sentencing errors.326 The 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure has resolved to 
consider a possible amendment to Rule 52 to permit consideration of 
 
 320. Id. at 301. 
 321. See United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[A] defendant[’s] . . . 
due process rights have been violated by the sentencing court’s reliance on false or unreliable 
information, [if] he [can] make a showing of two elements: (1) that the challenged evidence is 
materially false or unreliable, and (2) that it actually served as the basis for the sentence.”); 
Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[A] sentence will be vacated on 
appeal if the challenged information is (1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably made the 
basis for the sentence.”). 
 322. United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that due 
process is violated upon a showing that allegations relied upon by the sentencing judge were 
“(1) false or unreliable, and (2) demonstrably made the basis for the sentence”). 
 323. See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24 (1999) (“[Defendant] knew of his right [to 
appeal] and hence suffered no prejudice from the omission.”); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 342 
(1994) (“The defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and 
suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement.”); United States v. Timmreck, 
441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (“Respondent does not argue that he was actually unaware of the 
special parole term or that, if he had been properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have 
pleaded guilty.”); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 (1962) (noting the lack of “aggravating 
circumstances” such as an affirmative denial of allocution rights, the judge being “misinformed 
or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances,” or evidence of what defendant would have 
addressed given the chance). 
 324. See, e.g., Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1144 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Finality ‘is 
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is 
deprived of much of its deterrent effect.’” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989))); 
Hawkins v. United States, 724 F.3d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he social interest in a belated 
correction of the error outweighed by the social interest in the finality of judicial decisions, 
including sentences.”). 
 325. See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral 
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 145–56 (2012) (discussing the arguments in favor of finality and why 
they are less pronounced in the context of correcting sentencing errors). 
 326. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he context of 
review of a sentencing error is fundamentally different[,] . . . [because] the cost of correcting a 
sentencing error is far less than the cost of a retrial.”). 
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sentencing errors outside plain-error review because such errors are 
less burdensome to revisit than trial errors.327 In addition, forcing 
prisoners to serve longer sentences than the law contemplates only 
expends more resources on costly incarceration. 
The decisions denying relief also stress the risk of opening the 
floodgates to more appeals.328 But career offenders comprise less than 
3 percent of federal sentences.329 The career offender flood is 
probably less ominous than these appellate judges fear. What is more, 
the Guidelines themselves provide an intuitive limiting principle: 
courts could implement a rule that limits relief to defendants subject 
to erroneous criminal history overrides because of the overrides’ 
drastic effect on a defendant’s Guidelines range. And courts should 
weigh finality against interests in justice and fundamental fairness. 
After all, “without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic 
achievement.”330 The Sentencing Commission, for example, voted to 
retroactively reduce base offense levels for certain drug crimes in the 
interest of fairness, and the multitude of federal sentences eligible for 
reconsideration dwarfs erroneous career offender sentences.331 What 
is more, finality need not overwhelm the interest in fairly sentencing 
defendants the way the law accurately contemplates. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether stemming from concerns for due process or 
fundamental fairness, the availability of relief for sentences based on 
factual, legal, or procedural error rests on the principle that at 
sentencing judges should have an accurate picture of the defendant, 
 
 327. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., AGENDA BOOK 487 (May 2014). 
 328. Hawkins, 706 F.3d at 824 (expressing concern about the toll on the courts’ and Justice 
Department’s resources if “every precedential decision interpreting the guidelines favorably to 
a prisoner were a ticket to being resentenced”). 
 329. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 101, at 1 (stating that of the 84,173 cases 
reported to United States Sentencing Commission in 2014, only 2232 included career offender 
enhancements). 
 330. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1337 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Hill, J., 
dissenting). 
 331. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Unanimously Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking Sentences 
(July 18, 2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/press-releases-and-news-
advisories/press-releases/20140718_press_release.pdf [http://perma.cc/XP9E-UEW5] (projecting 
that more than 46,000 prisoners will be eligible for resentencing due to changes in the drug-
quantity table). 
BAILEY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2016  7:30 AM 
2016] RUN-ON SENTENCE 1519 
the offense, and the law’s treatment of both. Under today’s advisory 
regime, judges retain significant discretion in imposing sentences. 
When a judge sits down to sentence a defendant, she ought to 
consider only accurate inputs. In the pre-Guidelines days when 
judges’ discretion was even greater, flawed inputs meant a flawed 
sentence, and defendants had a due process right to a new one. 
Today, the Guidelines are a very significant input. Since Congress 
reformed the federal sentencing system, it has evolved in the context 
of uncertainty. Federal prosecutors, Congress, the Commission, and 
the courts are still resolving how to consistently and fairly execute 
that system. When that uncertainty leads to a prisoner serving a 
career offender sentence that he would not face if sentenced today, he 
should at least have a remedy for correcting it. 
